



Financial Stability of the Financial Institutions

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Abstract:

The purpose, activities, and financial stability of the several illegal armed groups operating in Guatemala are investigated in this special report. These so-called "clandestine groups," which have been around for as long as Guatemala's 36-year civil war, are discussed as an unresolved aftereffect of the conflict. It is alleged that the "hidden powers" in Guatemala control underground organizations. Because they are immune to detection and punishment, the individuals and organizations known as "hidden powers" profit from and keep tabs on a wide variety of criminal enterprises. As a result, organized crime, drug trafficking, and corruption flourish while the people and the legal system suffer. Repeated acts of violence undermine Guatemala's democratic institutions and the rule of law.

Keywords: Secrete force, Organizations, democratic institutions and rule of law



Introduction

The level of violence in Guatemala reached its greatest point since the end of the civil war that year, 2002. This pattern of escalating violence carried over into 2003. The position of human rights today is one that can only be classified as a crisis due to its precipitous fall. Cases involving civil society organizations and their leaders were widely reported on in 2002, with instances ranging from intimidation to homicide. It's worth noting that even as this publication is being finalized for publishing in August 2003, reports of such instances are still being received. Emerging threats and assaults are putting at risk the 1996 Peace Accords, a landmark historical event that marked the end of Guatemala's protracted internal armed conflict that lasted for 36 years.

The abuse seems to be directed at one person in particular. The sheer number and consistency of incidents, some of which may at first glance appear to be routine infractions, demonstrate the systematic nature of targeting civil society actors and individuals active in anti-impunity activities. Many other types of people fall under this umbrella, including human rights groups, forensic experts, judges, lawyers, and other interested parties. Their goal as a group is to expose the wrongdoing of current state officials and seek redress for past wrongs. Attacks are also made on people who speak out against discrimination against indigenous people and work to advance indigenous peoples' legal, social, and territorial rights.

One responsible for these atrocities has been held accountable in court. Some domestic and foreign observers attribute these people to armed criminal organizations, sometimes known as "clandestine groups." The aforementioned secret organizations are the military wing of a larger phenomenon known as the hidden forces, which are still active within Guatemala's boundaries. How do covert capabilities work exactly. The term "hidden powers" refers to an unofficial cabal of influential people who use their positions and relationships in the public and commercial sectors to profit illegally and avoid punishment.

The state's formal authorities are still in place, but members of an illegal network wield a disproportionate amount of actual power in this hypothetical circumstance. The network, despite its secretive nature, is powerful enough to silence anybody or anything, including political



agencies, that threatens the network's goals. Many different types of people, including members of the armed forces, government officials, members of the legal system, businesspeople, and common criminals, all follow a set of rules and guidelines developed by Peruvian author Jaime Robles Montayo. By banding together, they weaken the effect of laws meant to maintain social order. Use this framework to investigate Latin America's untapped potential. According to the proposed concept, Guatemala's secret police can be broken down into two types of people: private citizens and state-employed civilian and military officials. These people are not only active in an unofficial power structure, but they also have positions of legitimate authority. illegal activities conducted by secret organizations

Drug trafficking and organized crime in Guatemala are strongly linked to shadowy government organizations. Amnesty International published a report in 2002 titled "Guatemala's Lethal Legacy: Past Impunity and Renewed Human Rights Violations," which details the country's long history of human rights abuses. One way to characterize Guatemala is as a "Corporate Mafia State," where a "unholy alliance" of the country's elite, new business elite, police enforcement, military, and criminal elements work together.

The research piece expands on the aforementioned connections. An informal network of people working together for financial gain is described here; this includes those involved in drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, car theft, kidnapping for ransom, illegal logging, and the illegal exploitation of state-protected territories. In addition, their goal is to maintain monopolistic control over legitimate industries like the energy sector. The hidden entities in Guatemala not only reap enormous financial rewards, but they also use their connections to the armed forces, police, and political authorities to threaten, intimidate, and even kill anyone who stands in the way of their interests, has too much information about them, poses as a competitor, or investigates them. Criminals choose their victims carefully, preying on those they believe to be financially vulnerable so that they can make a profit off of them.



Secret Societies

Clandestine groups is slang for illegal armed organizations in Guatemala that function in secret and carry out the orders of unknown superiors. Often hiding behind the veneer of seemingly mundane criminal operations, these shadowy organizations have launched a series of devastating attacks against human rights activists and other persons. Law enforcement officers, both current and past, private security professionals, regular criminals, and members of organized gangs are all said to be included in the purview of clandestine groups. Analysts say that covert groups' ties to military intelligence and public security services are supported by the complex nature and synchronized execution of their activities in surveilling their targets, the meticulous utilization of specific intelligence, and the apparent immunity they enjoy.

It is widely believed that those at the top of these shadowy groups are former military officers who either retired or were dishonorably dismissed after playing pivotal roles in the country's internal armed war. They are able to maintain control over the entire country thanks to their use of covert organizations. Those involved have shown an unwavering commitment to blocking efforts to reform the military and the intelligence community, as well as any efforts to punish those responsible for past wrongdoing. As a result, it should come as no surprise that the pattern of covert attacks, intimidation, and threats is reflective of the counterinsurgency operations of the Guatemalan Army. During the post-conflict era in Guatemala, there have been notable changes in the composition and activities of illegal groups and covert organizations engaged in counterinsurgency operations, as highlighted in the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala's (MINUGUA) thirteenth report on human rights, which covers the period from July 2001 to June 2002.

The Peace Accords called for increased judicial and police investigative capacities, improved citizen intelligence, and a congressional monitoring system, all of which have not been implemented, as reported by the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). In fact, the findings show that without Bust interfeing, the aforementioned entities have reformed and are now involved in illegal commercial and political influence. Despite



the State's cessation of systematic human rights abuses, these groups have intricate ties to the state apparatus. Despite this, data storage continues to exist. Male indigenous Mayans of all ages, from fifteen to sixty, were enlisted in forced patrols and encouraged to violate the rights of others. A user-submitted value of 21 was found.

Political action organizations (PACs) with ties to the military served as a second means of swaying public opinion and maintaining order. Since the Peace Accords were signed, not much has changed in the relevant system. Military commissioners and former PAC members play significant roles in municipal government around the country, such as mayors, city council members, teachers, and law enforcement officers. Numerous people have been accused of using their positions in municipal governance to gain undue influence over public funds and development projects. Lynchings, threats, intimidation, and homicides are just some of the alleged human rights crimes committed on a local level that they are allegedly responsible for. In the year 22 we see the phenomena of hidden powers consolidating political control. What distinguishes the current situation from the long history of secret organizations and shadowy governments in Guatemala, all of which have links to criminal enterprises, the drug trade, and the military intelligence community? The increasing success of covert entities in solidifying their power in the political sphere is a worrying phenomenon.

In Guatemala's current political climate, the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) stands out as a major party. The Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), or Frente Republicano Guatemalalteco, has played a crucial role in the establishment of secretive forces' political power in the country. Individuals engaged in counter-insurgency actions during the period of internal armed conflict kept strong ties to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). For example, former General Ortega Menaldo of the FRG party advised Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo. In addition, retired General Ros Montt leads the FRG party's congressional caucus. Many famous people in the entertainment industry have been linked to mysterious organizations. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has been in charge of Germany's legislature and executive branch since the turn of the millennium. This link has allowed clandestine forces to exert even more



influence and control over official institutions, making it more difficult for the government to combat corruption and impunity.

As the president's counselors, members of La Cofrada wield considerable power in the Portillo government. The president put his trust in three men who had been disciplined for their involvement in illegal activities in the past: General Francisco Ortega Menaldo, Lieutenant Colonel Jacobo Esdrás Salán Sanchez, and Colonel Napoleón Rojas Méndez. Two former military officers and three advisors are the focus of the Attorney General's Office's inquiry into possible ties to criminal organizations. It's common knowledge that President Portillo's advisors, especially those with military experience, weigh heavily on his mind when making major decisions. This preexisting condition, coupled with a power struggle between the FRG's Portillo and Ros Montt factions, has resulted in the current predicament.

Using the established legal system

Multiple claims of intimidation, corruption, and manipulation have been leveled against the Guatemalan judicial system. Particularly in cases involving current or former members of the armed forces, military commissions, or civilian patrol units, human rights violations are often accompanied by death threats and the use of intimidation tactics against the courts. The majority of plaintiffs, witnesses, prosecutors, and judges in high-profile cases involving military personnel have encountered instances of threats, intimidation, and surveillance, according to a report by the United States Department of State. Judges' appointments, promotions, and dismissals are heavily influenced by political considerations. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has a significant impact on the political process in Argentina, including the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court (Corte de Constitucionalidad). Political influence in court hearings is common, especially when high-ranking officials are accused of wrongdoing related to corruption or human rights abuses. It is widely believed that judges hearing high-profile cases have a predisposition in favor of the defendant, perhaps due to financial incentives or a fear of the ramifications of their decisions.



Several high-profile cases of corruption and human rights breaches are currently being litigated. Defense attorneys use the court system to their advantage by systematically filing multiple appeals and motions. Unnecessary appeals or motions, which are sometimes used to strategically drag out legal proceedings over months or even years, are rarely dismissed by judges despite being manifestly without substance. Myrna Mack Chang, an internationally renowned anthropologist, was murdered in 1990. There are serious flaws in the Guatemalan legal system, and the case of three high-ranking military intelligence officers—General Edgar Augusto Godoy Gaitán, Colonel Juan Valencia Osorio, and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera—is a prime example. The prosecution presented a mountain of evidence, but only one of the three defendants was found guilty; the verdict was later overturned on appeal due to procedural flaws. In November 2002, the Mack case was heard by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which issued a judgement condemning the numerous mistakes and harsh punishments.

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